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Abstract
A system using an oversampled Fourier transform for hiding data is given in [J.R. Miotke,
L. Rebollo-Neira, Oversampling of Fourier coefficients for hiding messages, Appl. Comput. Har-
mon. Anal. 16 (2004) 203–207]. When viewed as a cryptographic algorithm, we demonstrate here
that the system is susceptible to a known plaintext attack.
© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In [9], a system is developed using an oversampled Fourier transform to hide mes-
sages, specifically to store or transmit data in an encrypted form. The oversampled Fourier
transform is described in terms of frame theory. Although the algorithm described in [9]
uses frames in infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces, in practice, the algorithm utilizes finite
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G. Bhatt et al. / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 320 (2006) 492–498 493frames. The present paper discusses finite frames, specifically the concept of orthogonal
frames. We then discuss the exact implementation of the encryption scheme as presented
in [9], and we apply a known plaintext attack. Finally, we discuss a numerical simulation
of the attack in which we obtain more accurate reconstruction of the original data than that
obtained in [9].
Two principles guide our analysis of the proposed data hiding algorithm. First,
Kerckoff’s Law states that the security of a system should rely only on the secrecy of
the key, not on the secrecy of the algorithm. Stated another way, we assume that an ad-
versary knows the algorithm, but not the key. The second principle is that an encryption
system should be robust against a known plaintext attack. This is where an adversary has
a list of plaintexts with the corresponding ciphertexts, each encoded using the same key,
from which the adversary tries to determine the key used, or more generally, how to decrypt
future ciphertexts encrypted using the same key [8].
We remark that a similar algorithm is proposed in [7], utilizing the orthogonality of cer-
tain pairs of frames. The algorithm there is susceptible to the same attack as the algorithm
under consideration here.
1.1. Finite frames
Frames for Hilbert spaces are being used in many signal processing applications such
as sampling theory, multiple access communications, etc. Frames provide redundancy via
linear dependence, where bases do not, and it is this redundancy that makes them advan-
tageous to use in these settings. Redundancy provides the flexibility of non-uniqueness of
coefficients in linear expansions. In this paper, the redundancy will be utilized for encrypt-
ing data.
Let H be a Hilbert space over the field F with scalar product 〈·,·〉 and norm ‖ · ‖, where
F denotes either R or C. A frame for H is a subset X := {xn}n∈J of H , where J is a finite
or countable index set, such that there exist constants 0 < A  B < ∞ such that for all
v ∈ H ,
A‖v‖2 
∑
n∈J
∣∣〈v, xn〉∣∣2  B‖v‖2. (1)
Clearly, a frame spans the Hilbert space; however, the elements of a frame are not required
to be linearly independent. The frame {xn} defines the following frame operator
SX :H → H :v 	→
∑
n∈J
〈v, xn〉xn
which is positive and invertible. Define {x˜n} ⊂ H , the standard dual of {xn} by
x˜n := S−1X xn. Then for all v ∈ H ,
v =
∑
n∈J
〈v, xn〉x˜n =
∑
n∈J
〈v, x˜n〉xn.
If A = B = 1, the frame is said to be Parseval (or tight), and then for all v ∈ H ,
v =
∑
〈v, xn〉xn.n∈J
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If H is finite dimensional (H will always be assumed to be so from here on, unless
specifically stated), then a frame sequence (possibly finite) is any spanning set {xn}n∈J
such that
∑
n∈J ‖xn‖2 < ∞. If only a finite number of xn’s are non-zero, then we will
discard those that are zero, and call {xn}Mn=1 a finite frame. See [1,3,5] for more on finite
frames.
The (finite) Parseval frames in H are characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let {xn}Mn=1 ⊂ H , where H has dimension N . The following are equivalent:
(1) {xn} is a Parseval frame for H ;
(2) the M ×N matrix whose ith row is xi (as a row vector) has columns which are ortho-
normal;
(3) there exists a Hilbert space K of dimension M − N and vectors {yn}Mn=1 ⊂ K such
that the M ×M matrix formed by⎛
⎜⎝
x1 | y1
... | ...
xM | yM
⎞
⎟⎠
is a unitary matrix.
Here we write the vectors xi and yi as coordinate row vectors with respect to any ortho-
normal bases for H and K , respectively.
Proof. The proof of the equivalence of 1 and 2 is in [1]. The proof of the equivalence
of 1 and 3 is, for frames in infinite dimensional spaces, contained in [6, Corollary 1.3,
Theorem 1.7]. The case for finite frames is analogous. 
Remark 1. Another way to view Proposition 1 is that {xn} is a Parseval frame for H if
and only if {xn} is the inner direct summand of an orthonormal basis {xn ⊕ yn} for some
dilation H ⊕ K of H .
Definition 1. Two frames {xn}Mn=1 ⊂ H and {yn}Mn=1 ⊂ K are orthogonal if for all v ∈ H ,∑M
n=1〈v, xn〉yn = 0.
Proposition 2. Suppose {xn}Mn=1 ⊂ H and {yn}Mn=1 ⊂ K are Parseval frames; they are
orthogonal if and only if⎛
⎜⎝
x1 | y1
... | ...
xM | yM
⎞
⎟⎠=: (P | Q)
has columns which form an orthonormal set, where xj is the row vector of complex con-
jugates of the coefficients of xj with respect to any orthonormal basis of H , and yj is the
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Proof. (⇐) Consider the two matrices P and Q whose rows are {xn} and {yn}, respec-
tively. A straight forward computation demonstrates that for v ∈ H ,
M∑
n=1
〈v, xn〉yn = Q∗Pv, (2)
where Q∗ is the conjugate transpose of Q. It follows that if the above matrix has orthonor-
mal columns, then Q∗P = 0, and thus the frames {xn} and {yn} are orthogonal.
(⇒) Conversely, suppose the Parseval frames are orthogonal. Note that by Proposition 1,
the left part P of the above matrix has orthonormal columns; likewise the right part of the
matrix Q also has orthonormal columns. By Eq. (2), we must have that the columns of the
left part of the matrix are orthogonal to the columns of the right part of the matrix. Hence,
the columns of the matrix form an orthonormal set. 
Let X := {xn}Mn=1 ⊂ H ; the analysis operator ΘX of {xn} is given by
ΘX :H → FM :v 	→
(〈v, x1〉, 〈v, x2〉, . . . , 〈v, xM 〉).
One possible matrix representation of ΘX is given by the matrix P as in Proposition 2. The
proof of Proposition 2 shows that two frames {xn} and {yn} are orthogonal if and only if
their analysis operators ΘX and ΘY have orthogonal ranges in FM .
1.2. Encryption using finite frames
We present here an overview of the encryption algorithm proposed in [9], as well as [7].
It is a private key encryption scheme using orthogonal frames. The encoding requires two
orthogonal Parseval frames {xn}Mn=1 ⊂ H and {yn}Mn=1 ⊂ K . Let ΘX and ΘY denote their
analysis operators, respectively. Suppose m ∈ H is a message (or plaintext); let g ∈ K be
a non-zero vector chosen at random. The ciphertext c ∈ FM is given as follows:
c := ΘXm +ΘYg. (3)
To recover the message, we apply Θ∗
X
:
Θ∗
X
c = Θ∗
X
ΘXm +Θ∗XΘYg =
M∑
n=1
〈m,xn〉xn +
M∑
n=1
〈g,yn〉xn = m + 0 = m.
Since the plaintext can be recovered from the ciphertext by applying a linear transfor-
mation, the encryption algorithm is susceptible to a known plaintext attack. Indeed, simply
collect enough plaintext–ciphertext pairs {(mi, ci)} so that {ci} spans FM , then find the
(unique!) matrix V = Θ∗ such that V ci = mi .X
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In [9], the authors propose using oversampled Fourier coefficients to create a space to
hide information while transmitting (or storing) a signal. The algorithm proposed uses H =
L2[−T ,T ], and the frame {eiπant/T }n∈Z ⊂ L2[−T ,T ] for some a ∈ (0,1). The number a
is called the oversampling parameter and is the key for retrieving the hidden data. A matrix
U is derived from the matrix G; G acts on l2(Z), whose matrix entries are given by
Gm,n = 12T
T∫
−T
e−iπamt/T eiπant/T dt = sinca(m − n)π.
Then, U is a matrix whose columns correspond to vectors in the nullspace of G.
The practical implementation involves a M ×M submatrix of G, which we still call G,
and U an M × N matrix whose columns are the (normalized) eigenvectors corresponding
to the N smallest eigenvalues of G. (G is in fact invertible, but has many small eigenval-
ues; all eigenvalues are unique. We assume that the N chosen eigenvalues are sufficiently
small. G is also Hermitian, so it’s eigenvectors are pairwise orthogonal.) If h ∈ FN is
a message to be hidden, one computes M Fourier coefficients of a non-zero function
f (t) ∈ L2([−T ,T ]) by
cm = a√
2T
T∫
−T
f (t)e−iπamt/T dt;
then Uh, and finally
c ′′ = c +Uh, (4)
where c is the vector of Fourier coefficients cm. Thus, if h is the plaintext, c ′′ is the en-
crypted output, or ciphertext.
Note that ‖GU‖ ≈ 0 (the matrix norm), since the range of U corresponds to the sub-
space spanned by the eigenvectors of G with eigenvalues nearly 0. The matrix G is a
positive matrix, and is in fact the Gram matrix for the collection of functions {eiamt/T : m =
0, . . . ,M − 1} ⊂ L2[−T ,T ], which form a frame for their closed span. We can identify c
with ΘEf , where ΘE is the analysis operator for the collection of exponentials. We have
the following:
• G = ΘEΘ∗E ;• ‖U∗ΘE‖ ≈ 0 since ‖ΘEΘ∗EU‖ ≈ 0, and the range of U corresponds to a space
spanned by eigenvectors for G with small eigenvalue;
• U∗c ′′ = U∗ΘEf + U∗Uh ≈ h. The reconstruction error ‖U∗c ′′ − h‖ depends upon
the magnitude of the eigenvalues of G to which U corresponds.
Comparing Eqs. (3) to (4), we have ΘE = ΘY, U = ΘX, g = f , and m = h. Therefore,
we can apply a known plaintext attack to the data hiding system.
Theorem 1. Let h ∈ FN be a plaintext, U , c, and c ′′ be as in Eq. (4). The plaintext h can be
obtained from U and the ciphertext c ′′, and U can be determined from a sufficiently large
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algorithm in Eq. (4) is vulnerable to a known-plaintext attack.
Proof. For a fixed oversampling parameter a, which is the key of the encoding algorithm,
the matrix U is uniquely determined up to a permutation of the columns. We may assume
that the columns of U are determined by the decreasing order of the eigenvalues of G (as
specified in [9]). Suppose {hj , c ′′j } is a list of plaintext–ciphertext pairs, each encoded with
the same oversampling parameter a, but utilizing possibly different “cover” signals fj .
Since the matrix U satisfies
U∗c ′′j = U∗ΘEfj +U∗Uhj ≈ hj , (5)
if the list of pairs is sufficiently large so that {hj } spans FN , find the (unique!) matrix U
satisfying the system of equations above.
Any subsequent plaintext h0 encoded via
c ′′0 = ΘEf0 + Uh0
can be recovered by applying U∗ which was previously determined. 
We remark here that we will not recover h0 precisely, however, in [9], the plaintext there
is also not recovered precisely, but there is a small error in the reconstruction of the hidden
data.
2.1. Numerical experiment
In [9], the authors consider an example using 81 non-oversampled coefficients, an over-
sampling parameter of a = 1/2, and the function f (t) = sinc(t − 2)t3, with T = 4. They
obtain a reconstruction error of 5.1×10−11. The hidden message h (or plaintext) is a vector
of randomly generated numbers.
We ran a simulation of the known plaintext attack on their system using the same pa-
rameters. Since the attack requires a list of plaintext–ciphertext pairs, we use plaintexts of
randomly generated numbers, and functions fj (t) = sinc(t − 2j)t3. After computing the
matrix U∗ by solving the system of Eqs. (5) and applying it to a new ciphertext, we obtain
a reconstruction error of 1.1 × 10−13.
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